Everything about Kabylia
Seks (6) nordmenn mistet livet i den tragiske gisseltakingen i Algerie. Norske medier virker som at de helst vil glemme hele saken, noe som passer godt til den norske politiske eliten, som er i hypnose av de arabiske landene, og våger ikke å si dem imot. Vi må ikke glemme de 6 norske arbeiderne som ble ofret for franske økonomiske interesser.
New York Times skriver; “Ved å satse på Iyad Ag Ghaly, lederen av Ansar Eddine, har Algerie sådd frøene til gisseltaking i gass komplekset Tiguentourine (Amenas)”. “Tvertimot», skriver avisen. “å ha tette bånd med en mektig leder av en væpnet gruppe, på den andre siden av grensen med Mali, “som Pakistan i Afghanistan” “kunne ikke beskytte (de) algirske interesse”.
Ved å gjeste en representant for Ansar Eddine, som ble innkvartert i et luksuriøst hotell i hovedstaden,” har Alger “næret en hoggorm,” hevder artikkelen i New York Times. “Men i stedet for å sikre at konflikten forblir utenfor Algerie, har krigsherren, Iyad Ag Ghaly, til slutt, bragt den til innsiden. Hans styrker har plutselig gått mot hovedstaden Bamako i Mali i januar, og gjorde sine algeriske sjefer rasende, og provoserte en fransk militær intervensjon, og, til slutt, ga ekstremister et kamprop for å angripe et gassfelt i Algerie og drepte minst 38 gisler”, tilføyer avisen. “Offensiven til de væpnede gruppene mot sør i Mali, som utløste den dødelige kjeden av hendelser har sjokkert mange algeriere,” sa representant for Mr. Ag Ghaly i Algerie, Mohamed Ag Aharib sitert av NYT. “De fortalte meg at de ikke ville ha noe mer med meg å gjøre,” la han til.
“Vi har to typer logikker som gjelder disse organisasjoner og mennesker. Den ene er ideologien, den andre er den lokale logikken,” sier Georg Klute, tysk professor ved universitetet i Beirut, om mosaikken av opprørere, røvere og islamistiske militante i regionen. For ham har Algerie satset på at “Ansar Dine kan være en motvekt til forsøket på å bygge en uavhengig Touareg stat .” “Så de lukket øynene for grensepassering av Ansar Dine for drivstoff, biler og reservedeler,” sier Georg Klute. For sin del, mener Boukhars Anwar, en ekspert på Nord-Afrika ved Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, at Alger strategien i sine forbindelser med Ag Ghaly “var en ekte feil” fordi “feil fra starten.” Forresten, en algerisk ekspert som ønsker å være anonym, ble overrasket over at ingen stilte spørsmål om den merkelige og absurde “offensiven” av Ansar Eddine og jihadister mot sør Mali. “Prosessen er så lite rasjonell at vi kan legitimt spørre om Ansar Eddine ikke har blitt manipulert til å engasjere seg i en handling som rettferdiggjør alt,” sier den algirske anonyme kilden.
LGIERS — To the Algerians, the desert warlord in the swirling blue robes was a man of his word — the key to managing the crisis next door in northern Mali — and for months they lodged his representative here in the Algerian capital in high style in one of the city’s finest hotels.
They were nurturing a viper. The warlord, as the Algerians well knew, was the leader of one of the militant Islamist groups holding northern Mali captive. That was not a deal-breaker, they reasoned. To the contrary, having tight connections with a powerful militant across the border, much as Pakistan does in Afghanistan, could protect their interests.
But instead of ensuring that the conflict remained outside their country, a longstanding imperative of the Algerians, the warlord, Iyad Ag Ghali, ended up bringing it right to them. His forces made a sudden push toward the Malian capital in January, enraging his Algerian patrons, bringing on a French military intervention and ultimately giving extremists a rallying cry to seize an Algerian gas field, leading to the deaths of at least 38 hostages.
“They told me they didn’t want to have anything more to do with me,” recalled Mr. Ag Ghali’s representative in Algeria, Mohamed Ag Aharib. The militant offensive in Mali, which set off the deadly chain of events, “really shocked the Algerians,” he said.
For months, the United States and French officials upheld Algeria, with its counterterrorism know-how and the biggest military budget in Africa, as the linchpin in resolving the threat of Islamist extremism in Mali.
But Algeria helped maintain its dominance of the Sahara by playing favorites among the various armed groups plaguing its neighbor, a policy that backfired tragically last month and failed to achieve its most basic aim: to push the problem away.
The tangled web of allies and interests across the volatile region underscore the unique difficulties the French and the African forces could face as they begin to wrest control of Mali’s north from the jihadists who have held sway there for almost a year.
Chasing a few hundred foreign fighters inspired by religious zeal from the vast, trackless area would be challenge enough. But the forces shaping the conflict are far more complicated than that, driven by personal ambitions, old rivalries, tribal politics, the relationship between militants and states, and even the fight for control of the lucrative drug trade.
All of these power struggles have helped shape the fate of the region — and they will almost surely continue long after the battle to recapture the north is over.
“We have two kinds of logic looking at these organizations and these people,” Georg Klute, a professor at the University of Bayreuth, Germany, said of the mosaic of rebels, bandits and Islamist militants in the region. “One is the ideology. The other is the local logic.”
Mr. Ag Ghali’s own evolution is a case in point. A charismatic Tuareg aristocrat who for years had been alternatively leading rebellions in the desert and helping tamp them down, he once functioned as a liaison for European governments seeking to pay huge ransoms to release kidnapped tourists. He was even named Mali’s consul general in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, from 2007 to 2009.
“He has been on both sides of everything,” said Gregory Mann, an associate professor of African history at Columbia University.
Even Mr. Ag Ghali’s pivotal decision to form Ansar Dine, one of the Islamist groups that seized northern Mali last year, stemmed as much from local politics and personal ambition as his newfound devotion to enforcing a puritanical form of Islam.
In late 2011, scholars say, he made a bid to become head of his Tuareg tribe — a position that would have put him at the forefront of northern Mali’s struggle for autonomy. When he was rebuffed, Mr. Ag Ghali struck out on his own and formed Ansar Dine, branding it as a religiously inspired alternative to the more secular Tuaregs.
Though Algeria is brutally intolerant of Islamist militants — having fought a bloody war against them in the 1990s that ultimately led to the creation of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb — it found common ground with Mr. Ag Ghali. Ansar Dine may have been religious, but its ambitions did not seem to challenge Algeria directly. By contrast, the Tuaregs, newly fueled with nationalists returning from Libya, were demanding independence, frightening Algeria that its own minorities might become inspired as well.
The Algerians gambled that “Ansar Dine could be a counterweight to these attempts to erecting an independent Tuareg state,” Professor Klute said, so “they closed their eyes when Ansar Dine crossed the border” for “gas, cars, spare parts.”